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BOOK REVIEWS
New Perspectives on Old-Time Religion, by George N. Schlesinger. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1988. Pp. 196. Cloth $34.50.
Reviewed by LINDA ZAGZEBSKI, Loyola Marymount University.
George Schlesinger's new book is full of appealing ideas in spite of its
unappealing title. It addresses a large collection of issues in religious philosophy-some old, some new, some connected, most not. The chapters on
miracles and the Design Argument make heavy use of the calculus of probability, thus accounting for the "new perspectives" which the book promises.
At the same time the issues are important traditional ones, though occasionally with a novel twist, as we shall see.
Chapter One races through a long list of divine attributes with special
attention to puzzles about their consistency. Those readers familiar with the
recent literature on the attributes will probably find the discussion much less
thorough than would be desired. It was not clear to me why Schlesinger
picked out the views of certain people for critical scrutiny and left out others
which I would have thought were more important. For example, he devotes
five pages to a very bad argument of Nicholas Rescher, only to conclude that
the argument is very bad (pp. 36-41).
The main insight of this chapter is an interesting view on the unity of the
attributes. True to the spirit of the Anselmian concept of God, Schlesinger
claims that every divine attribute is included in the concept of perfection.
However, God's perfection does not include the possession of each greatmaking property to the highest possible degree since the maximization of
some of these properties is incompatible with the maximization of others.
Instead, perfection should be understood as superexcellence, defined as "the
possession of each enhancing attribute to the precise degree required so that
in combination they contribute to the maximum sum total of magnificence"
(p. 1). So to say that God is omnipotent or omniscient is not to say that no
conceivable being has more power or knowledge, but that any such being
would be inferior to God since its extra power or knowledge would be acquired at the price of "giving up some more desirable quality" (p. 1).
Schlesinger uses this view of the attributes to answer what he calls the
"Many-gods objection" to Pascal's Wager in Chapter Six (pp. 155-56) and to
the Design Argument of Chapter Five (p. 135). In Chapter One he is mainly
interested in using it to resolve a series of conceptual puzzles. To name three:
(1) The stone paradox and related paradoxes can be solved as long as
Schlesinger is right that any being who can create a stone he cannot lift is
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inferior to a being who cannot create such a stone but can lift anything
whatever.
(2) God's immutability means nothing more than the degree of constancy
needed for excellence. If the excellence of God with respect to knowledge
requires change, God changes. In other words, God is not immutable in the
ordinary sense.
(3) The alleged conflict between God's omnipotence and his inability to
sin (impeccability) is solved as long as the ability to sin would make God
inferior. "To reduce God's impeccability by any amount in order to make Him
more powerful would result in less Divine excellence; on the contrary, having
Him absolutely impeccable even at the cost of reducing His power results in
maximum excellence" (p. 26). Impeccability, then, is one of the few, if not
the only commonly-discussed attribute which emerges unweakened by the
Schlesinger move. No possible being has more goodness than God.
Let us look more closely at Schlesinger's concept of superexcellence, or
what he sometimes calls "supereminence." By the definition quoted above,
the precise degree of each divine attribute is included in or entailed by
superexcellence so that in toto they constitute maximum magnificence. However, I see no reason to think superexcellence is determinate with respect to
each of the divine attributes. I can think of three possible cases in which the
possession of an attribute would be indeterminate: (1) when two attributes
are indifferent with respect to greatness, (2) when two great-making attributes
are equal with respect to greatness, and (3) when two great-making attributes
are incommensurable. Schlesinger considers the first and third possibilities
himself, but rejects them for what seem to me to be inadequate reasons.
Chapter Two on the problem of evil is devoted to an elaboration of
Schlesinger's previously-published solution and answers to objections and
queries. The main thrust of his move is to define what he calls Degree of
Desirability of State (DDS) as "a two-valued function depending both on the
potentials of the individual and the extent to which his needs are being taken
care of' (p. 54). An unsatisfied pig has a lower DDS than a satisfied pig, who
has a lower DDS than an unsatisfied Socrates, who in turn has a lower DDS
than a satisfied Socrates, who has a lower DDS than a dissatisfied super-Socrates, and so on. There is no highest DDS, and so it is logically impossible
for an omnipotent being to bring about such a state. "No matter by how much
the DDS of an individual is increased, it would be precisely as short of being
of maximum height as it is now" (p. 61). There is, therefore, no point in
complaining that we are not higher on the scale.
It seems to me that Schlesinger is right that there are two values of measure
in desirability of state, but I would think that they function on two distinct
scales of evaluation, only one of which has no upper limit. For whatever kind
of created being you choose, it is true that it is possible that there is a being
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higher in potential, but it is not true that for any degree of satisfaction
you feel, there is a higher one. The concept of fully satisfied pig or fully
satisfied Socrates is perfectly coherent. Further, we all get very much more
upset by not having our desires satisfied and our actual potential realized
than by not having the desires and potential of a higher being. It seems,
then, that though we cannot expect an omnipotent and benevolent being
to maximize our DDS on the scale of potential, he could still maximize it
on the scale of satisfaction.
To my mind the most interesting chapter in the book is Chapter Seven on
divine justice. Here Schlesinger raises some very interesting and neglected
questions on what we might call religious luck. What determines the religious
worth of a person? Different individuals have different opportunities to avail
themselves of good reasons to believe in God, both in the form of evidence
for theism and in the form of a religious upbringing. Yet, Schlesinger argues,
those who do not believe in theism irretrievably lose something of supreme
value. But their loss is at least partly a matter of bad luck. Is this compatible
with the justice of God?
Schlesinger's short answer to the question "What happens to the sincere
skeptic?" is that there is no such person. It would be an intolerable violation
of divine justice if there were. "Consequently, those who are mature enough
to have become aware to some extent of the splendour of nature and the
nobility of faith, and yet refuse to embrace theism, must be people who find
religious discipline unendurable and will therefore do everything to render
their conscious minds oblivious to the basis of such discipline" (p. 173). This
is a severe view and readers will no doubt want to take it up in future
discussion.
New Perspectives on Old-Time Religion contains a number of new arguments which deserve attention in the literature. I have mentioned the ones I
found most interesting, but philosophers who enjoy applying probability theory to the topics of miracles and the Design Argument should not miss
Chapters Four and Five. The section on assigning prior probabilities in metaphysics (pp. 141-46) is particularly noteworthy. In addition, Chapter Three
includes an interesting discussion comparing the different ways religious and
secular morality treat the value of human life.

Revelation in Religious Belief, by George I. Mavrodes. Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1988. Pp. vii and 161. $24.95 (cloth).
Reviewed by WILLIAM J. ABRAHAM, Perkins School of Theology, Southern Methodist University.
Good books on divine revelation are few and far between. This short, tightly
argued work is a welcome exception. It is a model of succinct analytical work

